Scottish Nous

J. J. C. Smart's Encylopedia Entry on Time

I have been reading J. J. C. Smart's article on time (or a draft of that article or a draft of a revision of that article) which appears in The Encylopedia of Philosophy, edited by John Edwards (New York: Macmillian, 1967), Vol. 8, pp. 126-34.  Because this is an encylopedia, I was very surprised to find the tone of that article to be so polemical.  Rather than choosing to provide readers with a history of various the developments in the philosophy of time, Smart instead opts to (mostly just) assert that one particular view of time is correct.  In the course of setting forth this view, he tramples over anyone who disagrees with him.

For example, Augustine was "led to puzzle [over time] here [in the Confessions] because he demands, in effect, that non-analogous things [space and time] should be talked about as they they were analogous."  We then learn that Augustine is further confused because he happens to be a presentist:

This thought - that the present is real in a way in which past and future are not real - is part of the confusion of the flow or passage of time.  This is not to say that presentism has not recently been very intelligently defended, however implausibly, as by John Bigelow.  (We might regret that so fine a fellow as Bigelow should think of himself as only instantaneous.)

Is this encylcopedia material?  Smart limits himself to defending eternalism, the position according to which all times are equally real.  All sentences with express tense on their surface are to be translated into so-called tenseless sentences with added indexical referents to a tokened utterance.   So, for example, to say "Caesar crossed the Rubicon" is really to express the proposition otherwise expressed by the English sentence "Caesar crosses the Rubicon earlier than this utterance".  (I said "so-called tenseless" because it is not clear to me that "this utterance" does not itself involve a reference to the present, i.e., "the utterance I am now making".)  To flesh out this picture, Smart lays all his eggs in the four-dimensionalist basket.  This makes Caesar a four dimensional space-time worm who lies (tenselessly) along a world line in the space-time manifold.  According to Smart, Caesar didn't move through time.  In fact, Caesar may not have moved at all.  Rather, "Caesar moves (tenselessly) earlier than this utterance" is true in virtue of proper parts of Caesar's space-time worm lieing (tenselessly) at different portions on Caesar's world line.  Note that the worm which is Caesar exists both earlier, simultaneous with, and later than this utterance, as well as earlier, simultaneous with, and later than any other utterance.  In the common tensed idiom, Caesar's worm has always existed and will always exist.  Get the picture?

Most of this is layed out very articulately, but there are few arguments adduced in its defense.  For the most part, we're supposed to accept it because the "special theory of relativity has made it impossible to consider time as something absolute; rather, it stands neutrally between absolute and relational theories of space-time."  I'm not sure what Smart's point is, but it is clear that he's staking out a substantive anti-constructivist position in the philosophy of science.  For example, Michael Tooley is guilty of being "bold enough to consider modifying special relativity".  Unlike Smart, I prefer not to be hog-tied by scientific theories with counterintuitive entailments, especially when those theories contradict other well-received scientific theories.   This is not to say they should be ignored, but Smart's assurances all of this can be worked out as research continues fall a bit flat.

What of the obligatory treatment of Zeno and Cantor?  Here Smart says

Given the concepts available to him, Zeno rightly rejected the view that an extended line or time interval could be composed of unextended points or instants.

This has a very odd ring in my ears, but let's leave that aside.  The fallacy in Zeno's famous argument that one could never traverse a finite distance composed of infinitely many points is diagnosed by Smart as the mistaken belief that the points of the continuum are sequential.  Perhaps, although Smart doesn't clarify.  In any case, this is relevant because it relates to the structure and geometry of space-time.  How do we get dimension, and so space-time geometry, out of mathematics without avoiding Zenoesque paradox?  Easy.  Smart says:

The set of all rational points on a line has dimension 0.  So does the set of all irrational points.  In these cases an infinity of "unextended points" does indeed form a set of dimension 0.  Since these two sets of points together make up the set of points on a line, it follows that two sets of dimension 0 can be united to form as set of dimension 1... The modern theory of dimension shows that there is no inconsistency in supposing that an appropriate nondenumerable infinity of pints makes up a set of greater dimensionality than any finite or denumerable set of points would.

Smart has given us two sets of points, both of which he asserts have dimension 0.  These are the set of rationals and the set of irrationals.  Now this is interesting.  First of all, there are continuum many irrationals and only a countable infinity of rationals.  It's true that the set of rationals plus the set of irrationals yields the line, but assuming the Continuum Hypothesis, the set of irrationals has a cardinality one order of infinity higher than the cardinality of the set of rationals.  This means that two sets of the same cardinality, aleph one, can differ in their dimension.   What is going on?  This is itself suspect, but it seems to contradict Smart's last cited claim above.  On the theory Smart has so quickly sketched, it is only the case that a "non-denumerable infinity of points makes up a set of greater dimensionality than any finite or denumerable set would" if a set of a non-denumerable infinity of points can make up set with the same dimensionality as a denumerable set.  Now if  Smart hasn't erred, he certainly hasn't given us anything satisfying.

A major theme of Smart's entry is that we have to disabuse ourselves of the pernicious notion of the "flow of time".  Too many philosophers have been seduced and led into error by this relatively commonsensical view.  But these philosophers usually have their own reasons for rejecting Smart's picture, such as "dubious philosophical reasons connected with the notion of free will".  What of those who opt for a causal theory of time?  Well, "perhaps they could rely on causal connectibility and not on connectedness."  But "connectibility is a modal notion and so will not be liked by philosophers such as those influenced by Quine, who are suspicious of modality."  Or perhaps philosophers influenced by that dubious notion of free will won't like the fact that Smart holds that their entire worm already lies in the space-time manifold.  On this view, all propositions about parts of my worm lying past the part writing this sentence are either true or false.  No problem.  These concerns can easily be allayed by pointing out i) that this theory does not imply determinism because it is consistent with indeterminism, ii) indeterminism and free will are incompatible, and iii) compatibilism is possibly true.  Points (ii) and (iii) are unsatisfying and point (i) looks false.

The general point here is that Smart, in an encylopedia entry, presents a particular philosophy of time as the obviously correct view.  Yet this view is highly controversial.  Opposing views are hardly discussed, and when merely mentioned, they get dismissed with immensely philosophically unsatisfying one-liners.  Objections to the view Smart puts forth are presented tersely and treated as if they all stem from an archaic philosophical tradition.  To be fair, almost all objections to any view mentioned in the article, including views Smart doesn't favor, are presented in one line.  Thus we can skip a discussion of presentism because it has "difficulty... analysing cross-temporal statements such as 'Smith will have come before you have finished breakfast'".  The entry is a fun read, and it contains a lot of good information, but it's way too polemical and limited to be included in any encylopedia.

Existential Willie

Bill Clinton recognized, and rightly so, that "is" has many different meanings.  For example, leaving tense aside, we have (probably, and at least) the 'is' of predication ('that sunset is red'), the 'is' of existence ('God is not'), the 'is' of constitution ('that table is wooden'), and the 'is' of identity ('Hesperus is the evening star').  If you want to read about tense, however, I can think of no better philosopher than "Existential Willie":

It depends on what the meaning of the word 'is' is. If the--if he--if 'is' means is and never has been, that is not--that is one thing. If it means there is none, that was a completely true statement....Now, if someone had asked me on that day, are you having any kind of sexual relations with Ms. Lewinsky, that is, asked me a question in the present tense, I would have said no. And it would have been completely true. [Slate]

Efficacious Raw Feels

I would please like to kill the next epiphenomenalist who tells me I haven't spent the past two hours writhing in pain and unable to sleep because my mental states, in particular my sensations of pain due to a terribly upset stomach, have been causing me to writhe about in misery.  That is all for now.

Excerpt From The Fourth Meditation

From the Cottingham, Stoothoff, and Murdoch (CSM) translation:

Next, when I look more closely at myself and inquire into the nature of my errors (for those are the only evidence of some imperfection in me), I notice that they depend on two concurrent causes, namely on the faculty of choice or freedom of the will; that is, they depend on both the intellect and the will simultaneously.  Now all that the intellect does is to enable me to perceive the ideas which are subjects for possible judgments; and when regarded strictly in this light, it turns  out to contain no error in the proper sense of that term.  For although countless things may exist without there being any corresponding ideas in me, it should not, strictly speaking, be said that I am deprived of these ideas, but merely that I lack them, in a negative sense.  This is because I cannot produce any reason to prove that God ought to have given me a greater faculty of knowledge than he did; and no matter how skilled I understand a craftsman to be, this does not make me think he ought to have put into every one of his works all the perfections which he is able to put into some of them.  Besides, I cannot complain that the will or freedom of choice which I received from God is not sufficiently extensive or perfect, since I know by experience that it is not restricted in any way. 

Indeed, I think it is very noteworthy that there is nothing else in me which is so perfect and so great that the possibility of a further increase in its perfection or greatness is beyond my understanding.  If, for example, I consider the faculty of understanding, I immediately recognize that in my case it is extremely slight and very much finite, and I at once form the idea of an understanding which is much greater – indeed supremely great and infinite; and from the very fact that I can form an idea of it, I perceive that it belongs to the nature of God.  Similarly, if I examine the faculties of memory or imagination, or any others, I discover that in my case each of these faculties is weak and limited, while in the case of God it is immeasurable.  It is only the will, or freedom of choice, which I experience within me to be so great that the idea of any greater faculty is beyond my grasp; so much so that it is above all in virtue of the will that I understand myself to bear in some way the image and likeness of God.  For although God’s will is incomparably greater than mine, both in virtue of the knowledge and power that accompany it and make it more firm and efficacious, and also in virtue of its object, in that it ranges over a greater number of items, nevertheless it does not seem any greater than mine when considered as will in the essential and strict sense.

This is because the will simply consists in our ability to do or not do something (that is, to affirm or deny, to pursue or avoid); or rather (vel potius), it consists simply in the fact that when the intellect puts something forward for affirmation or denital or for pursuit or avoidance, our inclinations are such that we do not feel we are determined by any external force.  In order to be free, there is no need for me to be inclined both ways; on the contrary, the more I incline in one direction – either because I understand that the reasons of truth and goodness point one way, or because of a divinely produced disposition of my inmost thoughts – the freer is my choice.  Neither divine grace nor natural knowledge ever diminishes freedom; on the contrary, they increase and strengthen it.  But the indifference I feel when there is no reason pushing me in one direction rather than another is the lowest grade of freedom; it is evidence not of any perfection of freedom, but rather of a defect in knowledge or a kind of negation.  For if I always saw clearly what was true and good, I should never have to deliberate about the right judgment or choice; in that case, although I should be wholly free, it would be impossible for me ever to be in a state of indifference.

From these considerations I perceive that the power of willing which I received from God is not, when considered in itself, the cause of my mistakes; for it is both extremely ample and also perfect of its kind.  Nor is my power of understanding to blame; for since my understanding comes from God, everything that I understand I undoubtedly understand correctly, and any error here is impossible.  So what then is the source of my mistakes?  It must be simply this: the scope of the will is wider than that of the intellect; but instead of restricting it within the same limits, I extend its use to matters which I do not understand.  Since the will is indifferent in such cases, it easily turns aside form what is true and good, and this is the source of my error and sin.  - CSM, Vol. II, pp. 39-41.

 

Some Funny Things

Here are some funny things I  heard this week:

(1)  "My daughter isn't religious!  She reads the Bible!"

Ok.  So I understand this statement.  Being "religious" is equated - for the fundamentalists - with being pharisaical.  The class of so-called "religious folk" is co-extensive, according to those who use this locution, with the class of common, hypocritical, sometimes church-going sinners who hit chapel only on Easter and Christmas.  These poor folks, doomed to hell, profess faith in a deity but don't actually live in accordance with their beliefs.  They're whitewashed tombs: appearing clean and shiny on the outside, they're really decaying refuse on the inside.  In short, the "religious" exhibit misleading outer evidence of a righteous and holy life, while inwardly they're rotting and stinking things up.   Still, it's funny.  Say it again with me: "My daughter isn't religious!  She reads the Bible!"  Good for her.

(2)  "Matter is inherently spatial.  If there were no matter, space wouldn't exist."

I'm was a bit confused here.  First, it wasn't clear to me what was meant by the inherent spatiality of matter.  I was inclined to think that the inherent spatiality of matter meant that matter necessarily and essentialy had spatial properties.  After all, matter is extended in three dimensions, so it has the spatial property of being extended.   That something is extended entails that there is something through which that thing is extended, namely space.  But the exponent of statement (2) didn't see things this way.  There is only something through which a material thing can be extended, he thought, if there are material things.  We discussed whether or not, if all matter was "vanished", space would still exist.  He seemed to think not.  One does, of course, wonder where the matter was vanished from (surely not from nothingness!).  (Yes, I'm a diehard substantivalist. Go Newton!  Go Newton!)

An interesting exercise:  Put your finger in the air and use the tip of it to mark a single point at a particular time t.  Now do the same thing again with a finger on your other hand.  The distance between your two fingers is somewhere between 0 and 10 feet, but what do you think the distance between those two points in space is?

(3)  "I've got all my rows in a duck."

This was amusing.  It was also uttered by the same person who uttered (1).  Brings new meaning to mixed metaphors, doesn't it?

(4)  Quoting Kant, "Time doesn't really exist.  If there were no perceivers, there would be no  such thing as time.  Time is just the form of inner intuition."

The same person who was guilty of asserting (2) attempted to pursue a similar tactic with respect to the unreality of time.  (Come on... McTaggart and Zeno were on to something.)  Still, it seems to me that if anything exists, it exists at some time.  If it manages to exist for some duration, that is, for awhile, then there are several times at which it exists.  Of course, some things exist.  Furthermore, some things have existed which no longer exist (dinosaurs, for example).  Therefore, there are times at which things have existed, and at the present time, some things no longer exist.  Since there are times, time exists.  Some things would have existed even if no perceivers existed.  Therefore, time would have existed even if no perceivers ever existed.  So time is not "just" the "form of inner intuition". 

Now I find (1), (2), (3) and (4) equally humorous.  I hope this doesn't tell poorly about my philosophical abilities.  I understand that some philosophers defend (2) and (4), but then, some philosophers are also 4-D'ers and Lewisian Modal Realists.  =)  If you want more basic, intuitive arguments for the views espoused in the responses to (2) and (4), feel free to ask.

For the record, here are some of the tenets of commonsensism:

(A)  Everything is wholly present at every time it exists.
(B)  The past existed, but does no longer.
(C)  The present exists, but only for a moment.
(D)  The future will exist, but does not yet.
(E)  If anything exists, there is some location at which it exists.
(F)  Space is three-dimensional.
(G)  The shortest distance between two points in space is a straight line.
(H)  And that is enough for tonight...

Name That Theory

An elegant exposition due to Robert A. Heinlein.  It's from the short story  "Life Line" in The Man Who Sold The Moon.  Buy the book for yourself.  Then use this illustration to teach your students:

He stepped up to one of the reporters.  "Suppose we take you as an example.  Your name is Rogers, is it not?  Very well, Rogers, you are a space-time event having duration four ways.  You are not quite six feet tall, you are about twenty inches wide and perhaps ten inches thick.  In time, there stretches behind you more of this space-time event reaching to perhaps nineteen-sixteen, of which we see a cross-section here at right angles to the time axis, and as thick as the present.  At the far end is a baby, smelling of sour milk and drooling its breakfast on its bib.  At the other end lies, perhaps, an old man someplace in the nineteen-eighties.  Imagine this space-time event which we call Rogers as a long pink worm, continuous through the years, one end at this mother's womb, the other at the grave.  It stretches past us here and the cross-section we see appears as a single discrete body.  But that is illusion.  There is a physical continuity to this pink worm, enduring through the years.  As a matter of fact, there is physical continuity in this concept to the entire race, for these pink worms branch off from other pink worms.  In this fashion the race is like a vine whose branches intertwine and send out shoots.  Only by taking a cross-section of the vine would we fall into the error of believing that the shootlets were discrete individuals.

He paused and looked around at their faces.  One of them, a dour hard-bitten chap, put in a word.

"That's all very pretty, Pinero, if true, but where does that get you?"

Someone was reading their philosophy...

Beyond Physics

Girl:  I headed up a chapter of the University of Metaphysics.
Me:  [Oh great...]  That's interesting.  What subject matter does one study there?
Girl:  Mostly things about the mind.
Me:  [Yeah.  I bet.]  Oh, like neuroscience, cognitive science or psychiatry?
Girl:  The way I like to explain is to say that "meta" means "beyond".  So we study everything "beyond physics".*
Me:  [Enough!]  So you study chakras?
Girl:  Yes!  And we study the Akashic Records, Buddhism, the Bible, the Bagavagita, and the Ascendant Masters, etc...  It's difficult to explain.  Most people don't understand.
Me:  [Damn, what a terrible mix.]  No, I think I've got it.  You believe that we have chakras, right?  I mean, you wouldn't want to be studying something that doesn't exist.
Girl:  Of course we have chakras.
Me:  Do you just study the lives of the Ascendant Masters, or do you commune with them as well?
Girl:  Well, actually that's how the school was founded.  Yogi Sha-ma Nistic-Ghanda** communed with an Ascendant Master and was told to start a school.
Me:  Uh huh.

*The title of Aristotle's "Metaphysics" meant "after the physics" - not "beyond physics", although the Greek may certainly mean that as well too.  In Aristotle's case, "after the physics" (meta ta physika) was intended by some editor to mean  "the book I put after the 'Physics'".  Very creative titling, no?
** This is not his real name, but at this point I was trying to hard to suppress laughter to commit the name of some random religious nutcase to memory.

Hoffman Mistranslation?

In "Cartesian Composites" Paul Hoffman offers a translation of an important passage that differs suspiciously from the CSM translation of the same.  There are two strange paragraphs on complete and incomplete substances, the second of which, while it looks designed to follow from the first, doesn't seem to.  Hoffman's translation forces a parallelism on Descartes that appears to render his [Descartes'] argument cogent.  Furthermore, the parallelism Hoffman is trying to foist upon Descartes strengthens Hoffman's own case dramatically, permitting a fast and easy route to his conclusion that mind-body unions are substances in their own right.  This doesn't look good, particularly given the sort of mistranslation in question.

Descartes and Markie on Pure Corporeal Substance

[This is just some very casual writing.  Comments are welcome, but don't expect anything exceedingly technical or ridiculously rigorous.  All references are to the Cottingham, Stoothoff, and Murdoch translation.]

Substances, like almost everything else for Descartes, come in many flavors.  In the Principles of Philosophy [CSM I 210], he uses what is commonly referred to as the Independence Criterion (IC) to distinguish between primary and secondary substances.  God is the only primary substance, and all other substances are secondary.  In the Fourth Set of Replies [CSM II 157], he distinguishes complete from incomplete substances.  Incomplete substances are substances which compose part of something else which is itself a “unity in its own right”.  So a hand is an incomplete substance in so far as it is considered as being part of another substance which may be taken as a unity, namely a human body.  Now many, if not all incomplete substances can, when considered by themselves, also be labeled complete substances.  Thus a hand is a complete substance when it is considered simply as a hand, rather than as a member of a human body.  Finally, in the Synopsis [CSM II 10], Descartes draws a line of demarcation between pure and impure substances.  Pure substances, like the mind, are not made up of any accidents, while impure substances such as the human body are accidental conglomerations of some sort.  It is in the Synopsis passage that Descartes famously references “body, taken in a general sense” and calls it an indesctructible substance.  Using the various distinctions between substances Descartes has provided us with, how should we best classify it?  Below, I argue somewhat loosely that, while Peter Markie is correct in construing it as a pure substance, he does so for the wrong reasons.

Eklund

This has been public for sufficiently many days now, so I'll scoop Leiter and break the news.  Matti Eklund has an outstanding offer from Cornell.  It looks like CU is going to lose another excellent metaphysician and philosopher of language.  (That's only my speculation.)  My congrats to Matti, however.