Scottish Nous

Hippie Epistemology

A strange group of people interrupted the thesis writing at my favorite local coffee shop.  Sometime after they had finished setting up dozens of tea lights around the stage, I wandered back up to the front of the coffee shop for a cigarette.  Forced to pass by the table they had turned into a checkpoint to stop everyone passing into the back of the coffee shop and accost them for a "donation", I glanced down and read the following "warning" on their flier: "Be prepared to rethink some of what you already know."  Obviously, their performance was going to be detrimental to my epistemic health.

Reason Go To Hell

Via Pharyngula, we get Ken Ham victimizing small children.  Do not read the following unless you're prepared to vomit.  Here's proof that Ken Ham is a mental pervert raping the minds of credulous pre-teens:

Evangelist Ken Ham smiled at the 2,300 elementary students packed into pews, their faces rapt. With dinosaur puppets and silly cartoons, he was training them to reject much of geology, paleontology and evolutionary biology as a sinister tangle of lies.

"Boys and girls," Ham said. If a teacher so much as mentions evolution, or the Big Bang, or an era when dinosaurs ruled the Earth, "you put your hand up and you say, 'Excuse me, were you there?' Can you remember that?"

The children roared their assent.

"Sometimes people will answer, 'No, but you weren't there either,' " Ham told them. "Then you say, 'No, I wasn't, but I know someone who was, and I have his book about the history of the world.' " He waved his Bible in the air.

Read More...

"Who's the only one who's always been there?" Ham asked.

"God!" the boys and girls shouted.

"Who's the only one who knows everything?"

"God!"

"So who should you always trust, God or the scientists?"

The children answered with a thundering: "God!"

The LA Times article these utterly depraved rantings of a lunatic were ripped from states:

A former high-school biology teacher, Ham travels the nation training children as young as 5 to challenge science orthodoxy.

I wonder if Ham needs to prey on five year olds because middle and high schoolers are just too smart for him?  Ham's diseased mind needs to rot away quickly before more children are infected with the contagion of irrationality he carries.

Intuitions: When are they Philosophical/Reliable?

Rationalist philosophers enjoy relying upon their intuitions apropos the truth and falsity of various propositions.  By "intuition", I don't mean a warm fuzzy feeling that a proposition is true.  Something like this might count as an "intuition" in common parlance, but philosophical concern is restricted to philosophical intuitions, otherwise known as "rational seemings".  A central tenet of the rationalist project is that such intuitions are justification conferring, and a plausible explanation for the source of the justification is that philosophical intuitions are accompanied with insight into why the proposition is either true or false.  If you understand the proposition in question, you will see that it must be true or else that it could not be true.  This suggests that the best candidates for propositions susceptible of intuitive justification are propositions concerning modal notions.  Oftentimes, those of a rationalist bent restrict this to alethic modality, but this need not be the case.

Those of a more empiricist bent point to cases in which our modal intuitions go awry as evidence that philosophical intuition cannot be justification conferring.  It is a standard rationalist response is to point out that this position is self-defeating.  Whether or not this response is succesfull turns in part on one's theory of justification.  In particular, externalists may be able to escape the charge of self-defeat.  But externalists are commonly sympathetic to reliability, and why think that our modal intuitions are not, in general, reliable?  This is an interesting philosophical question that has seen insufficient study.  Is there a good reason to think that our modal intuitions are reliable?

Classic cases of modal intuitions run awry can be generated from probability theory.  As it turns out, most people cannot probabilistically reason their way out of a paper bag.  But cases might arise in the domain of natural law as well.  For example, suppose we pull two glasses of water out of the tap at the same temperature.  We then heat one glass of water up and place them both in the freezer.  Is it possible that the glass containing the warmer water will freeze faster?  It would seem not.  Indeed, here is an argument that warmer water will not freeze faster than the cooler.  Whatever temperature t the cooler water is at, it will take m minutes to freeze.  Once the warmer water drops to temperature t, it will likewise take it m minutes to freeze.  Therefore, the warmer water will take m minutes to freeze plus the amount of time it takes to cool it down to t.  But this is longer than m minutes, so the cooler water will freeze faster.

As it turns out, that's a bad argument.  It is possible for warmer water to freeze faster than the cooler.  For more on this phenomenon, known as the Mpemba Effect, see here.  Aristotle noted it in Meteorologica I:

The fact that water has previously been warmed contributes to its freezing quickly; for so it cools sooner.  Hence many people, when they want to cool hot water quickly, begin by putting it in the sun. . .

Bacon also mentions it, and Descartes (somewhat carelessly) stated:

Experience shows that water that has been kept for a long time on the fire freezes sooner than other water. - Les Meteores

Go philosophers!  (Cecil, of the Straight Dope, bombs.)  Ok, but what's the point?  Well, before doing the empirical research, a rationalist philosopher might well take himself to have a philosophical intuition about this case.  Several questions present themselves.  Is this a rational seeming?  If not, why not?  One response might be that the proposition has to do with physical possibility.  Perhaps justification conferring philosophical intuitions concern only broad logical possibility?  It's clear that there can be no "insight into the truth" of the proposition "it is not physically possible for warmer water to freeze faster than cooler" since the proposition is false, but the argument I provided is tempting and could easily, I think, be mistakenly taken as the kind of insight into the truth of the proposition responsible for the justification conferring status of philosophical intuitions.  If this is so, then the rationalist is in a bad position.  But maybe only the foolish rationalist who failed to notice that the so-called "insight into the truth" required some (false) assumptions about the physical effects of temperature on bodies of water would be tripped up?  If so, do philosophical intuitions that confer justification never depend upon any assumptions?  It's clear that friends of intuitions (myself included) have a lot of work to do. 

God Told Me To Teach That Cancelled Class

The Mountain Enterprise has published a letter, or letter excerpt, from Sharon Lemburg, the would-be instructor of the cancelled "Philosophy of Design".  It begins:

The idea of this class was not created on the spur of the moment. I believe that this is the class that the Lord wanted me to teach.  And despite all odds, I am teaching the class.

Sounds like Abraham, doesn't it?  While this quote is a little frightening, it does not by itself disqualify someone from teaching a class on the philosophy of design.  It strikes me that some such class could be a legitimate addition to the curriculum and perhaps an interesting and fun way to introduce children to the philosophy of science.  I do not think that all discussions of Aquinas (Fifth Way), Hume (argument from analogy), Popper (falsificationism), or van Fraasen (empirical adequacy) need be beyond high school children.  Nor need presenting and evaluating the argument from fine-tuning, probabilistic arguments that rely upon the Likelihood Principle or Bayes Theorem, and design arguments such as Collins' be inaccesible.  There is plenty of material in the vicinity that could be made accessible to some high school students if taught by a competent philosopher.

Sharon Lemburg is not a competent philosopher, however.  She intended to teach her class using dozens of videos produced by crackpot creationist organizations like  AIG, NCN, CA, and CR.  For her syllabus see here and here.  She claims:

Some will look at this and say, “well, she has another motive...such as to preach the Gospel.” But you know that was not my intention.  My motives were honest and sincere, in that all I desired was to present an educational experience to give the students an opportunity to hear and study about the philosophers of design, to be able to critically analyze them and to learn to examine the opinions or philosopies [sic] and to weigh them...to ask who made the statement, what is their bias, what is their philosophy, what evidence do they bring?

The Importance of Epistemic Responsibility Made Self-Evident

trep*a*na*tion: a hole in the skull produced surgically.  Have you ever thought about acheiving a higher state of consciousness by asking a friend to bore a hole in your skull with a Dremmel?  Probably not.  From the diary of one man who self-trepanned himself:

When I take in much caffeine or THC, I feel flashes of heat from within my head. They happen in different parts of my head each time, always on top, but never by the hole itself. The first time it happened, when I was in a car with a friend, pulling a big bong hit, I started to feel the heat in my head and I heard a squirt sound inside my head.  At first, I silently panicked (what's the past tense of panic?). I thought to myself, "Am I having a hemorrhage in the brain or something?

Hmm.  Ok.  This, I think, speaks for itself.  What prompted this course of action?

Upon closer investigation, I found out about all of the other speculated benefits of going through this procedure. Out of all the writings I found available, all the reports, articles, websites, interviews, etc that I could find were two-sided of course, but only the arguments in favor contained anything that seemed like intelligent statements. There would be someone who had been trepanned raving about how great it was, or someone interested who was intelligently theorizing at great length, about how pleasant the effect would be and why. Then there would be the opponents. They would generally be doctors and medical practitioners and psychologists. They would say it was placebo, that the theories made no sense, that it was insane to consider, but would not argue against it nearly as well as the proponents had. This made me think that perhaps they were against it because it did indeed work. (emphasis added)

Eventually, Bryan Henderson, who seems quite epistemically honest if not epistemically responsible, arrives at the following realization:

I have come to the frustrating conclusion that the trepanation has had no lasting effect. I mean, the effects were subtle the whole time anyway and they appear to have worn off...  As much I hate to realize it, I believed what I wanted to believe.

But he still has a hole in his skull.  Ouch. 

Confusing Appearances with Reality

It is said that once the great Akbar drew a line and demanded of his wise man, Birbal, that he shorten the line without cutting or erasing from either side. The latter drew a longer line parallel to it and Akbar’s line was thereby shortened. Wisdom lies in drawing the longer line. -Activity, Nicholas Roerich [link]

No.

Unintentional Philosophical Funny

Lifted from a comments thread at Certain Doubts:

Weatherson:  I can’t remember if I mentioned this here before or not, but Richard Holton has a nice discussion of similar examples in “Some Telling Examples: Reply to Tsohatzidis” which is on his website at [link].  He’s rather dismissive of the idea that they tell against [the] factivity [of knowledge], which I think is the right attitude to have.

Kvanvig: Hi, Brian, yes, I agree entirely that dismissiveness is the right attitude here.

Hmm....  Unfortunately for humor's sake, I think Weatherson and Kvanvig agree.  Holton's paper contains one of the best ever tokens of a common type of construction often erroneously taken as evidence that knowledge is not factive:

He knew from experience that unless he made a formidable effort, a pattern was waiting to impose itself: a polite enquiry would elicit a polite response and another question ... He had asked her about tea making.  One more like that, and there would be nothing he could do ... Rather than tolerate more silence he settled after all for small talk, and began to ask, 'Have you lived here long?' But all in a rush she spoke over him, saying, 'How do you look without your glasses? Show me please.'

That beauty is from Ian McEwan's novel The Innocent.  Holton explains the superficially non-factive use 0f "knew" with "protagonist projection".

 

On Inductive Track Record Arguments

Ok.  You probably won't read this, but my working definition of epistemic circularity is currently as follows:

An argument A is epistemically circular for S just in case (i) the conclusion c of A asserts that a belief, class of beliefs, or belief forming way is epistemically successful; (ii) if A is to be a cogent argument, one or more of  the premises of A must enjoy, for S, the kind of positive epistemic status c ascribes to the belief, class of beliefs or belief forming way AND/OR the premises of A have positive epistemic status for S in virtue of being formed in the belief forming way mentioned as epistemically successful in c; (iii) S has no (and therefore could not rely upon) c-independent evidence for the satisfied consequent(s) of (ii), and finally (iv) if S were to have c-independent evidence for the satisfied consequent(s) of (ii), this evidence would probabilistically confirm the conclusion c of A.

This definition combines the right features of the accounts out there without succumbing to any counterexamples (that I have thought of).  I'm fairly confident that it's pretty good, and of course, since epistemic circularity is a somewhat technical notion, there is room for me to stipulate the definition.

If you're familiar with inductive track record arguments, the most famous example of which is the inductive track record argument for the reliability of sense perception, then you might be interested to know that my definition of an ec-argument has it that inductive track record arguments need not be epistemically circular.  Here's one inductive track record argument:

1.1  S formed the belief that p1 using a RBFM.
1.2  S is justified in believing p1.
2.1  S formed the belief that p2 using a RBFM.
2.2  S is justified in believing p2.

                    .
                    .

n.1  S formed the belief that pn using a RBFM.
n.2  S is justified in believing pn.
================================
Probably, S is justified in believing propositions formed using a RBFM.

ITRAs such as these are commonly considered to be epistemically circular.  But I claim that they are only epistemically circular if we place a reliability constraint (As Alston has been wont to do) on justification.  Such a reliability constraint is a constraint to the effect that an epistemic subject S cannot be justified in believing any proposition p unless S formed the belief that p in a reliable way.   Suppose (per impossible!) such a reliability constraint is true.  In this case, I take it that conditions (i) - (iv) of my definition are satisfied, and the argument will turn out to be epistemically circular for all cognizers.

But suppose that a subject was foundationally justified in believing all pairs of premises n.1 and n.2.  Further suppose that (correctly) the internalist is right about justification.  Then condition (iii) of my definition is not satisfied, for it is possible to have c-independent evidence that the premises have positive epistemic status (i.e., are foundationally justified) which makes no reference to a RBFM.  If this is the case, the argument merely demonstrates an interesting correlation between being justified and beliefs being formed in a reliable way, but since the obtaining of the latter is not a condition for the possibility of the former, the argument fails to be epistemically circular.

If I am right, then discussions of epistemic circularity that have taken ITRAs as paradigmatic examples of epistemic circularity are a bit misguided, at least in so far as ITRAs need not always be epistemically circular.
 

Your Brain is Painting the World

It's an illusion fest!  What do we think of this argument for sense data?  Next, go experience the Motion Aftereffect.  I now bring you the Rotating Snakes.  Those damn little pinwheels will not stop spinning.  For more anomalous motion, but this time only when the illusion is seen with one's peripheral vision, check out this .pdf on "Phenomenal Characteristics of the Peripheral Drift Illusion".  Here is a startling interactive Munker illusion.  A  more colorful Munker Illusion at the very bottom of this page.  And finally, the inconceivable Devil's Fork impossibly piercing a Penrose Frame.

The Contentless Question in Pseudo-Science

Along with such mainstream thinkers as Nietzsche, Derrida, Foucault, Lacan, Rorty, Cavell, Feyerabend, Gadamer, Wittgenstein, and Unger, and such intellectual movements as semiotics, deconstruction, psychoanalysis, structuralism, archeology/genealogy, and nihilism, feminists "share a profound skepticism regarding universal (or universalizing) claims about the existence, nature and powers of reason, progress, science, language and the 'subject/self.'"

That's from the first chapter in The Science Question in Feminism, by Sandra Harding.  Harding doesn't say what I am going to, but she should have.   The feminists she is talking about in the above paragraph are silly feminists who will never persuade anybody with a brain rightly insensitive to  anti-intellectual postmodern rhetoric.  For more on bad feminists who do much to ruin the reputation of legitimate members of the movement, see Vintage Piranha.  If you were wondering just what the "Science Question" is, I won't leave you hanging:

... the Science Question critiques appear skeptical that we can locate anything morally and politically worth redeeming or reforming in the scientific world view, its underlying epistemology, or the practices these legitimate.

I would hope that by the "scientific world view" she doesn't mean the everywhere accepted (at least, until QM) realism.  Or that by "epistemology" she doesn't mean confirmation theory, the merits of inductive inference, probabilistic reasoning, and so on... (Probability theory is for the emancipation of induction, not vaginas.)  But I fear that she does.  I suppose I'll never know for sure, however, because I just don't find myself inclined to read a book that begins by favorably associating one's own position with the aforementioned list of almost global (they aren't skeptical of their own theories) skeptics (the one clear, fun read - the no longer wholly skeptical Peter Unger - excepted).  Susan Haack also seems not to recommend further reading:

Where effort is directed by the hope of large grants into, say, the relevance of feminism to philosophy of science, the probability rises that the conclusion that will be reached is that feminism requires us, as Sandra Harding preposterously puts it, to "reinvent science and theorizing." (Challenged, nearly a decade later, to say what breakthroughs feminist science had achieved, Harding replied that, thanks to feminist scientists, we now know that menopause isn't a disease. Gosh.) [Skeptical Inquirer]

I now return you to your regularly scheduled activities.