Scottish Nous

Intuitions: When are they Philosophical/Reliable?

Rationalist philosophers enjoy relying upon their intuitions apropos the truth and falsity of various propositions.  By "intuition", I don't mean a warm fuzzy feeling that a proposition is true.  Something like this might count as an "intuition" in common parlance, but philosophical concern is restricted to philosophical intuitions, otherwise known as "rational seemings".  A central tenet of the rationalist project is that such intuitions are justification conferring, and a plausible explanation for the source of the justification is that philosophical intuitions are accompanied with insight into why the proposition is either true or false.  If you understand the proposition in question, you will see that it must be true or else that it could not be true.  This suggests that the best candidates for propositions susceptible of intuitive justification are propositions concerning modal notions.  Oftentimes, those of a rationalist bent restrict this to alethic modality, but this need not be the case.

Those of a more empiricist bent point to cases in which our modal intuitions go awry as evidence that philosophical intuition cannot be justification conferring.  It is a standard rationalist response is to point out that this position is self-defeating.  Whether or not this response is succesfull turns in part on one's theory of justification.  In particular, externalists may be able to escape the charge of self-defeat.  But externalists are commonly sympathetic to reliability, and why think that our modal intuitions are not, in general, reliable?  This is an interesting philosophical question that has seen insufficient study.  Is there a good reason to think that our modal intuitions are reliable?

Classic cases of modal intuitions run awry can be generated from probability theory.  As it turns out, most people cannot probabilistically reason their way out of a paper bag.  But cases might arise in the domain of natural law as well.  For example, suppose we pull two glasses of water out of the tap at the same temperature.  We then heat one glass of water up and place them both in the freezer.  Is it possible that the glass containing the warmer water will freeze faster?  It would seem not.  Indeed, here is an argument that warmer water will not freeze faster than the cooler.  Whatever temperature t the cooler water is at, it will take m minutes to freeze.  Once the warmer water drops to temperature t, it will likewise take it m minutes to freeze.  Therefore, the warmer water will take m minutes to freeze plus the amount of time it takes to cool it down to t.  But this is longer than m minutes, so the cooler water will freeze faster.

As it turns out, that's a bad argument.  It is possible for warmer water to freeze faster than the cooler.  For more on this phenomenon, known as the Mpemba Effect, see here.  Aristotle noted it in Meteorologica I:

The fact that water has previously been warmed contributes to its freezing quickly; for so it cools sooner.  Hence many people, when they want to cool hot water quickly, begin by putting it in the sun. . .

Bacon also mentions it, and Descartes (somewhat carelessly) stated:

Experience shows that water that has been kept for a long time on the fire freezes sooner than other water. - Les Meteores

Go philosophers!  (Cecil, of the Straight Dope, bombs.)  Ok, but what's the point?  Well, before doing the empirical research, a rationalist philosopher might well take himself to have a philosophical intuition about this case.  Several questions present themselves.  Is this a rational seeming?  If not, why not?  One response might be that the proposition has to do with physical possibility.  Perhaps justification conferring philosophical intuitions concern only broad logical possibility?  It's clear that there can be no "insight into the truth" of the proposition "it is not physically possible for warmer water to freeze faster than cooler" since the proposition is false, but the argument I provided is tempting and could easily, I think, be mistakenly taken as the kind of insight into the truth of the proposition responsible for the justification conferring status of philosophical intuitions.  If this is so, then the rationalist is in a bad position.  But maybe only the foolish rationalist who failed to notice that the so-called "insight into the truth" required some (false) assumptions about the physical effects of temperature on bodies of water would be tripped up?  If so, do philosophical intuitions that confer justification never depend upon any assumptions?  It's clear that friends of intuitions (myself included) have a lot of work to do. 

I Want One

The book bar.

J. J. C. Smart's Encylopedia Entry on Time

I have been reading J. J. C. Smart's article on time (or a draft of that article or a draft of a revision of that article) which appears in The Encylopedia of Philosophy, edited by John Edwards (New York: Macmillian, 1967), Vol. 8, pp. 126-34.  Because this is an encylopedia, I was very surprised to find the tone of that article to be so polemical.  Rather than choosing to provide readers with a history of various the developments in the philosophy of time, Smart instead opts to (mostly just) assert that one particular view of time is correct.  In the course of setting forth this view, he tramples over anyone who disagrees with him.

For example, Augustine was "led to puzzle [over time] here [in the Confessions] because he demands, in effect, that non-analogous things [space and time] should be talked about as they they were analogous."  We then learn that Augustine is further confused because he happens to be a presentist:

This thought - that the present is real in a way in which past and future are not real - is part of the confusion of the flow or passage of time.  This is not to say that presentism has not recently been very intelligently defended, however implausibly, as by John Bigelow.  (We might regret that so fine a fellow as Bigelow should think of himself as only instantaneous.)

Is this encylcopedia material?  Smart limits himself to defending eternalism, the position according to which all times are equally real.  All sentences with express tense on their surface are to be translated into so-called tenseless sentences with added indexical referents to a tokened utterance.   So, for example, to say "Caesar crossed the Rubicon" is really to express the proposition otherwise expressed by the English sentence "Caesar crosses the Rubicon earlier than this utterance".  (I said "so-called tenseless" because it is not clear to me that "this utterance" does not itself involve a reference to the present, i.e., "the utterance I am now making".)  To flesh out this picture, Smart lays all his eggs in the four-dimensionalist basket.  This makes Caesar a four dimensional space-time worm who lies (tenselessly) along a world line in the space-time manifold.  According to Smart, Caesar didn't move through time.  In fact, Caesar may not have moved at all.  Rather, "Caesar moves (tenselessly) earlier than this utterance" is true in virtue of proper parts of Caesar's space-time worm lieing (tenselessly) at different portions on Caesar's world line.  Note that the worm which is Caesar exists both earlier, simultaneous with, and later than this utterance, as well as earlier, simultaneous with, and later than any other utterance.  In the common tensed idiom, Caesar's worm has always existed and will always exist.  Get the picture?

Most of this is layed out very articulately, but there are few arguments adduced in its defense.  For the most part, we're supposed to accept it because the "special theory of relativity has made it impossible to consider time as something absolute; rather, it stands neutrally between absolute and relational theories of space-time."  I'm not sure what Smart's point is, but it is clear that he's staking out a substantive anti-constructivist position in the philosophy of science.  For example, Michael Tooley is guilty of being "bold enough to consider modifying special relativity".  Unlike Smart, I prefer not to be hog-tied by scientific theories with counterintuitive entailments, especially when those theories contradict other well-received scientific theories.   This is not to say they should be ignored, but Smart's assurances all of this can be worked out as research continues fall a bit flat.

What of the obligatory treatment of Zeno and Cantor?  Here Smart says

Given the concepts available to him, Zeno rightly rejected the view that an extended line or time interval could be composed of unextended points or instants.

This has a very odd ring in my ears, but let's leave that aside.  The fallacy in Zeno's famous argument that one could never traverse a finite distance composed of infinitely many points is diagnosed by Smart as the mistaken belief that the points of the continuum are sequential.  Perhaps, although Smart doesn't clarify.  In any case, this is relevant because it relates to the structure and geometry of space-time.  How do we get dimension, and so space-time geometry, out of mathematics without avoiding Zenoesque paradox?  Easy.  Smart says:

The set of all rational points on a line has dimension 0.  So does the set of all irrational points.  In these cases an infinity of "unextended points" does indeed form a set of dimension 0.  Since these two sets of points together make up the set of points on a line, it follows that two sets of dimension 0 can be united to form as set of dimension 1... The modern theory of dimension shows that there is no inconsistency in supposing that an appropriate nondenumerable infinity of pints makes up a set of greater dimensionality than any finite or denumerable set of points would.

Smart has given us two sets of points, both of which he asserts have dimension 0.  These are the set of rationals and the set of irrationals.  Now this is interesting.  First of all, there are continuum many irrationals and only a countable infinity of rationals.  It's true that the set of rationals plus the set of irrationals yields the line, but assuming the Continuum Hypothesis, the set of irrationals has a cardinality one order of infinity higher than the cardinality of the set of rationals.  This means that two sets of the same cardinality, aleph one, can differ in their dimension.   What is going on?  This is itself suspect, but it seems to contradict Smart's last cited claim above.  On the theory Smart has so quickly sketched, it is only the case that a "non-denumerable infinity of points makes up a set of greater dimensionality than any finite or denumerable set would" if a set of a non-denumerable infinity of points can make up set with the same dimensionality as a denumerable set.  Now if  Smart hasn't erred, he certainly hasn't given us anything satisfying.

A major theme of Smart's entry is that we have to disabuse ourselves of the pernicious notion of the "flow of time".  Too many philosophers have been seduced and led into error by this relatively commonsensical view.  But these philosophers usually have their own reasons for rejecting Smart's picture, such as "dubious philosophical reasons connected with the notion of free will".  What of those who opt for a causal theory of time?  Well, "perhaps they could rely on causal connectibility and not on connectedness."  But "connectibility is a modal notion and so will not be liked by philosophers such as those influenced by Quine, who are suspicious of modality."  Or perhaps philosophers influenced by that dubious notion of free will won't like the fact that Smart holds that their entire worm already lies in the space-time manifold.  On this view, all propositions about parts of my worm lying past the part writing this sentence are either true or false.  No problem.  These concerns can easily be allayed by pointing out i) that this theory does not imply determinism because it is consistent with indeterminism, ii) indeterminism and free will are incompatible, and iii) compatibilism is possibly true.  Points (ii) and (iii) are unsatisfying and point (i) looks false.

The general point here is that Smart, in an encylopedia entry, presents a particular philosophy of time as the obviously correct view.  Yet this view is highly controversial.  Opposing views are hardly discussed, and when merely mentioned, they get dismissed with immensely philosophically unsatisfying one-liners.  Objections to the view Smart puts forth are presented tersely and treated as if they all stem from an archaic philosophical tradition.  To be fair, almost all objections to any view mentioned in the article, including views Smart doesn't favor, are presented in one line.  Thus we can skip a discussion of presentism because it has "difficulty... analysing cross-temporal statements such as 'Smith will have come before you have finished breakfast'".  The entry is a fun read, and it contains a lot of good information, but it's way too polemical and limited to be included in any encylopedia.

Exposing UCLA's Radical Professors

The Bruin Alumni Association, an group of boring reactionaries confused about who they should be reacting to,  is running the blog UCLAProfs.com.  Mark Sawyer, a political science professor, is profiled on the blog and given a "three black fists" rating.  His response:

I now have tenure ... I have been away from UCLA for 2 1/2 years at Berkeley and Harvard.  I have been active though in the anti-war movement etc.  So I feel I deserve 5 fists.

Rock on!   Kieran Healy jestingly awards the site one-half of a McCarthy for being pretty boring.  The group of Bruins fans is paying students $100 for information on the UCLA radical left.   Draw your own conclusions.  I side with Eugene Volokh's opinions expressed here and here.  This is not a group of disgruntled alumni to be at all concerned about.  For example, the group seemed irritated that one professor opposed the judicial nomination of... a fellow alumni!  Because you've just got to have the back of anyone who attended your university, I suppose.  Go Bruins!

Gird Up Your Loins and Publish In Creation Research Society Quarterly

I just stumbled across the funniest letter ever.  The letter is from a certain D. Russell Humphreys, Ph.D., at the Institute for Creation Research.  You can read it here.  The letter is a reply from Humphreys to Kevin R. Henke regarding Henke's (apparent) debunking of Humphreys' (so-called) research designed to support the religious young earth view.  Humphreys says:

I normally don't reply to Internet posts from skeptics because I want them to try to publish their criticisms in peer-reviewed scientific journals, the proper place to carry out scientific debates.

What does Humphreys have in mind when he mentions "peer-reviewed scientific journals"?  Good question.  Here's the answer:

I also plan to submit technical details of this reply to a peer-reviewed scientific journal, the Creation Research Society Quarterly (CRSQ).  If Henke chooses to sling yet more mud, let him try to do so in a scientific journal.  The RATE helium research has been peer-reviewed and published in several different scientific venues.  Critics like Henke must gird up their loins and undergo the same kind of scientific discipline - if they want people to take them seriously.

What sort of scientific venues has the RATE helium research been published in?  Yet another good question!  How about Impact (a journal of the Institute for Creation Research which employs Humphreys), Proceedings of the Fifth International Conference on Creationism, and Creation Research Society Quarterly. 

It gets better and better.  Dr. Humphreys goes on to state, in this letter, that he based a theory of the creation of planetary magnetic fields on 2 Peter 3:5.  His theory is here.  Humphreys is reviving Thales, folks.  2 Peter 3:5 states, "... the earth was formed out of water and by water."  Here's the theory, which Humphreys touts as permitting him to predict the magnetic moments of Uranus and Neptune:

In 1984, when no space craft had yet reached Uranus and Neptune, I published a theory predicting the strength of the magnetic fields of those two planets in the Creation Research Society Quarterly, a peer-reviewed creationist scientific journal. I made the predictions on the basis of my hypotheses that (A) the raw material of creation was water (based on II Peter 3:5, "the earth was formed out of water and by water"), and (B) at the instant God created the water molecules, the spins of the hydrogen nuclei were all pointing in a particular direction.  The tiny magnetic fields of so many nuclei would all add up to a large magnetic field.  By the ordinary laws of physics, the spins of the nuclei would lose their alignment within seconds, but the large magnetic field would preserve itself by causing an electric current to circulate in the interior of each planet. By the same laws, the currents and fields would preserve themselves with only minor losses, as God rapidly transformed the water into other materials.

This is not a joke.  The original material of creation was H20, which God majickered, using his 1337 a1ch3mic4l ski115, into all the matter in the universe.  But I'll be late for my Metaphysics Seminar with Michael Tooley if I don't stop...

God Told Me To Teach That Cancelled Class

The Mountain Enterprise has published a letter, or letter excerpt, from Sharon Lemburg, the would-be instructor of the cancelled "Philosophy of Design".  It begins:

The idea of this class was not created on the spur of the moment. I believe that this is the class that the Lord wanted me to teach.  And despite all odds, I am teaching the class.

Sounds like Abraham, doesn't it?  While this quote is a little frightening, it does not by itself disqualify someone from teaching a class on the philosophy of design.  It strikes me that some such class could be a legitimate addition to the curriculum and perhaps an interesting and fun way to introduce children to the philosophy of science.  I do not think that all discussions of Aquinas (Fifth Way), Hume (argument from analogy), Popper (falsificationism), or van Fraasen (empirical adequacy) need be beyond high school children.  Nor need presenting and evaluating the argument from fine-tuning, probabilistic arguments that rely upon the Likelihood Principle or Bayes Theorem, and design arguments such as Collins' be inaccesible.  There is plenty of material in the vicinity that could be made accessible to some high school students if taught by a competent philosopher.

Sharon Lemburg is not a competent philosopher, however.  She intended to teach her class using dozens of videos produced by crackpot creationist organizations like  AIG, NCN, CA, and CR.  For her syllabus see here and here.  She claims:

Some will look at this and say, “well, she has another motive...such as to preach the Gospel.” But you know that was not my intention.  My motives were honest and sincere, in that all I desired was to present an educational experience to give the students an opportunity to hear and study about the philosophers of design, to be able to critically analyze them and to learn to examine the opinions or philosopies [sic] and to weigh them...to ask who made the statement, what is their bias, what is their philosophy, what evidence do they bring?

Maintenance

The blogroll has survived another long overdue overhaul.  Several group blogs didn't make it, such as Rochester, Western Michigan and Tufts (inactivity).  These were replaced by three heavy hitters: Plato's Beard (Notre Dame),  Hesperus/Phosphorus (USC), and the UCSB Philosophy Blog.  Enjoy the freshened links.

The Importance of Epistemic Responsibility Made Self-Evident

trep*a*na*tion: a hole in the skull produced surgically.  Have you ever thought about acheiving a higher state of consciousness by asking a friend to bore a hole in your skull with a Dremmel?  Probably not.  From the diary of one man who self-trepanned himself:

When I take in much caffeine or THC, I feel flashes of heat from within my head. They happen in different parts of my head each time, always on top, but never by the hole itself. The first time it happened, when I was in a car with a friend, pulling a big bong hit, I started to feel the heat in my head and I heard a squirt sound inside my head.  At first, I silently panicked (what's the past tense of panic?). I thought to myself, "Am I having a hemorrhage in the brain or something?

Hmm.  Ok.  This, I think, speaks for itself.  What prompted this course of action?

Upon closer investigation, I found out about all of the other speculated benefits of going through this procedure. Out of all the writings I found available, all the reports, articles, websites, interviews, etc that I could find were two-sided of course, but only the arguments in favor contained anything that seemed like intelligent statements. There would be someone who had been trepanned raving about how great it was, or someone interested who was intelligently theorizing at great length, about how pleasant the effect would be and why. Then there would be the opponents. They would generally be doctors and medical practitioners and psychologists. They would say it was placebo, that the theories made no sense, that it was insane to consider, but would not argue against it nearly as well as the proponents had. This made me think that perhaps they were against it because it did indeed work. (emphasis added)

Eventually, Bryan Henderson, who seems quite epistemically honest if not epistemically responsible, arrives at the following realization:

I have come to the frustrating conclusion that the trepanation has had no lasting effect. I mean, the effects were subtle the whole time anyway and they appear to have worn off...  As much I hate to realize it, I believed what I wanted to believe.

But he still has a hole in his skull.  Ouch. 

OMG, I Want to Puke

This is disgusting: WayTooMany.  You may never again want to be in the same room as a shot or beer after watching one or more of these.  Chug a beer and stick your head in the ceiling fan?  Ten shots of tequila through a beer bong?  This kind of glorified self-abuse would have been far beneath even Australopithecus.

Wherein I Diagnose Myself With the Flu

I don't usually get sick easily, or stay sick for long, but I've been unbelievably miserable for the past five days.  Fortunately, I can now report that this morning, my longest ever running fever seems to have finally broken.  The first two nights were horrible.  I was curled up under my blanket in a burning hot room shaking to death trying to warm my poor body up.  I suppose this is what is known a "the chills", but "the chills" were accompanied by a strange burning sensation that didn't provide any heat.  Fever during the chills: 102.  Otherwise: 99.5. 

The third night I avoided the chills, but traded them up for the sweats.  Fever still 99.5.  This is a good sign, as it means one's fever is starting to break, but I'm not sure which actually feels worse.  Trying to go back to sleep in a bed that feels like it has been soaked with a bucket of cold water is not at all pleasurable.  Last night I went to bed with my constant 99.5 fever, slept relatively peacefully, and woke up feeling much better.  Temperature in the morning: 98.6.  My immune system is finally winning!   Couple all this with a nasty case of pinkeye, an infection I understand frequently accompanies flu-like infections, and you clearly have me at my sickest ever. 

I have kept very close track of my symptoms, and based upon my observations, I think I can discriminate between the flu and the cold.  There is but one anomaly.  My fever only hit 102 when I had the shaking/chills, but I think it's common for flu sufferers to reach higher temperatures.  (Maybe I'm just hardy?)  Still, whatever it was hit instantly, was accompanied by an unremitting minor headache, some slight muscle achiness, a dry cough, and at least the first day, sudden and total lethargy.  I did have a bit of respiratory conjestion in the form of a leaky nose, but only on the third day.  Add to this that I landed a bacterial infection (pinkeye), and the balance of the evidence seems to favor the flu. 

Over the course of the past five days, I estimate I have spent 85% of my time in bed and consumed at least eight gallons of tea.  Hopefully I'll be able to go back to work soon as well as start being philosophically productive again.  Strangely, I can't go back to work until I get a signed note from my doctor stating that I'm fit to return to the workplace.  The last because the Cheesecake Factory treats their employees as if they were still in grade school.