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« July 2005 | Main | September 2005 »

Wednesday, 31 August 2005

Geocentrists Exist?

What?  I don't believe this:

One adult American in five thinks the Sun revolves around the Earth, an idea science had abandoned by the 17th century.

Go see the article in the NY Times, though.

What a Freeping Whacko

Oh no!  Little children are being exposed to homosexuality before they reach the "age of innocence":

During the homily at Mass today, our new priest was preaching about being "counter-culture" (what that had to do with the readings is beyond me), and said that he admires parents of gays and lesbians.  I was so astonished that he would expose pre-adolescent children to the concept of homosexuality that I had to walk out with our three kids. It's against everything I was always taught, and against Truth and Meaning of Human Sexuality by the Pontifical Council for the Family (which says that homosexuality should not be addressed with children who are not adolescents - age of innocence).

[From Big Brass Blog via Eschaton]

Saturday, 27 August 2005

UC's Secret Pro-Creationist Policy

A lawsuit has been filed in California over the University of California's refusal to credit high school students for courses using certain creationist textbooks.  A Beka Books and Bob Jones University Press are textbooks used almost exclusively by Christian fundamentalists.  The twelth grade Beka textbook Biology: God's Living Creation is touted as "thoroughly Christian in perspective and tone" as well as "truly nonevolutionary in philosophy".   Here's the  "Application Question" on page 134:

In a paragraph, explain how the structure of the skull is an example of God's design and provision for man.

And the "Critical Thinking" question on the same page:

Men and women both have exactly 12 pairs of ribs.  Why is this not a contradiction of Genesis 2:21-22?

Also, in section 7.2 on "The Appendicular Skeleton", we learn that:

God designed our upper extremities for both strength and dexterity.

I hope that the creationists win this lawsuit.  Yes, that's right.  If homeschoolers and fundamentalist religious schools who use these textbooks can demonstrate that their students are in a position to acquire a sufficient grasp of the basic subject material, I see no good reason why they shouldn't be admitted into a state university because they are also taught unscientific principles derived from an ancient, barbaric tribal religion.  And I can think of many excellent reasons why they should be accepted.  In particular, if they are accepted, the chance that they stop believing in creationism increases.  The crux of the argument is that students very much in need of higher education) and are otherwise capable of excelling are being arbitrarily deprived of that education.  Thus the title of this post.

Let me explain.  How could UC justify their absurd policy?  The argument from expediency fails. Discrimination against students on the basis of textbooks used is discrimination on a scale irrelevant to the ability of a student to perform at the college level.  Since the only relevant scale on which the candidacy of an applicant should be assessed has to do with their potential for intellectual achievement, the UC admissions officers are guilty of a form of discrimination that likely rules out some of the best qualified students.  There are plenty of criteria that may be used to assess a students potential for intellectual achievement other than which textbook they have used, and UC admissions officers should be using these criteria instead, whether or not this means more work for them (which it doesn't).

There is also the argument from the necessity of an education in evolutionary theory.  I do not deny that the above quotes are disturbing, but I do not grant that a state school has the right to demand that a student be taught evolutionary theory in order to gain admission to their university.   In fact, I find it utterly absurd, and indicative of a sort of narrow-minded bigotry unacceptable in a university adminstration, to insist that taking of a particular set of subjects be a necessary condition on being considered for admission.  This bigotry becomes unconscionable when it is extended to having studied  particular subsets of a subject.  The reasons for this are obvious.  Most of the students admitted to most universities are utterly incompetent with respect to at least some subjects taught in courses required for admission.  This demand reduces to the requirement that a student merely be exposed to a particular subset of a subject while remaining utterly independent of the student's competence.  Furthermore, if a student wishes to major in English, Mathematics, Philosophy, Poetry, Creative Writing, Chemistry, or Physics, I don't see how the quality of their education with respect to evolution bears at all upon their potential for success in their chosen discipline.  Of course, neither do university admissions officers believe this, since they'll readily admit a student who failed a class in one subject (biology included). 

Here is the argument that such students must not be discriminated against.  High school students who have had no choice in the content of their education (something coercively forced upon them by their fundamentalist parents) are discriminated against on the basis of factors that lie outside their control.  Higher education opens up a door, which many choose to walk through, to greater intellectual freedom and to increased ability for critical, reflective thought.  This comes largely through exposure to a diverse community of perspectives.  The impact this exposure can have on someone who has been raised in a sealed fundamentalist box and constantly plied with fundamentalist propoganda is drastic.  Students whose parents have chosen particular textbooks for them are denied this opportunity for exposure, even when they may be much more qualified than the average Joe.

It is clear that this policy serves none of the legitimate goals of an institute of higher education, the purpose of which is to further the education of its students and broaden their horizons.  If the adminstrators want to ensure exposure to evolutionary theory, they can do it by making evolutionary biology a mandatory course.  That would be non-discriminatory.  Insisting that children whose parents have deprived them of a particular form of education (namely an education that does not include evolutionary theory) may not attend a state school, which their parents were forced to support through taxation, places a severe and unjustified constraint upon the right of the child to further his education, and paradoxically ensures that one of the best routes out of epistemically irrational religious fundementalism will remain closed to him. 

Might this be a fundamentalist agenda in disguise?  Perhaps UC wants more Californians to be creationists?  It is possible that they want their citizens to remain uneducated, unexposed, and less capable of functioning in the broader community?  I doubt it.  Instead, I think that UC admissions officers are guilty of dereliction of their duties.  Hopefully it won't take a lawsuit to bring them into line.

Thursday, 25 August 2005

Tales from Volunteering

I volunteer weekly at a local charity (LUVS EFAA) and encounter some interesting people from time to time.  Today, a fairly desperate individual stopped by for some help and committed that all too common sin of attempting to break an awkward silence (not with myself) by futilely grasping for something, anything at all, to say, however embarrasing or regrettable it might afterwards be.  What he hit upon was an entirely unnecessary justification for being at EFFA seeking assistance:  "I'm only here because I came to Boulder to find my girlfriend.  I lost her in Sturgis."  As if his girlfriend was a lost cell phone.  There is no Sturgis in Colorado, although there is one over a thousand miles away in Michigan.  One hopes he doesn't find her.

I Wasn't Going to Do It....

... but here's a post on Robertson.  Listen to his "retraction":

"Is it right to call for assassination? No, and I apologize for that statement," Robertson said in a statement Wednesday. "I spoke in frustration that we should accommodate the man who thinks the U.S. is out to kill him." But Robertson insisted on his show that his words had been misinterpreted and that he had never spoken of assassination.  "I said our special forces should 'take him out,"' Robertson said on "The 700 Club." "'Take him out' could be a number of things, including kidnapping." The video from his telecast Monday shows Robertson saying of Chávez: "I don't know about this doctrine of assassination, but if he thinks we're trying to assassinate him, I think that we really ought to go ahead and do it." - IHT

Monday, 22 August 2005

Cartesian Libertarianism

[This post sets forth the topic of my next paper.  I had intended to include an examination of a controversial Fourth Meditation (CSM II 40) passage, but I've decided to save it for later as this post quickly became too long for a blog entry.  See below the fold  here for an excerpt from the Fourth Meditation (CSM II 39-41).]

I cannot complain that the will or freedom of choice which I received from God is not sufficiently extensive or perfect, since I know by experience that it is not restricted in any way. -Descartes, Fourth Meditation, CSM II 39

Compatibilists claim that it is possible for a person to possess a free will (i.e., be a free agent) in a wholly deterministic world.  Thus if every state of affairs is determined by an antecedent state of affairs in conjunction with eternal and immutable, universal laws of physics, compatibilists insist that we can still be free agents.  This can be further precisified by defining the causal "determined by" relation between states of affairs.  Let s1 and s2 be any two consecutive states of affairs in world w, where s1 is maximal.  Now let there be a set of inviolable laws [L1, L2, L3...] governing all interactions in w.  We say that s2 is determined by s1 in w if and only if [L1, L2, L3...] cause it to be that every time s1 obtains s2 obtains.  We are now in a position to better formulate the compabilist thesis.  Where s2 involves a person P's action, the compatibilist claims that it is possible for P to act freely even though s2 was determined by s1.

The libertarian denies this.  Where s2 involves P's action a, if s2 was determined by s1, then P did not freely a.  I will not sketch an account of libertarian free agency, but a rough formulation of a positive definition will be sufficient for this discussion. Libertarians believe that (at least some) people are (at least sometimes) the first causes of their actions.  A person P possess libertarian free agency only if he is capable of being the first cause of some action.  Obviously, being the first cause of some action is incompatible with being determined to so act by any antecedent state of affairs, whether internal or external to the agent.

Why such a precise formulation?  Well, in "Descartes's Compatibilism", Vere Chappell writes: "Compatibilism is the doctrine that the doctrine of determinism is logically consistent with the doctrine of libertarianism.  Determinism is the doctrine that every being and event is brought about by causes other than itself. Libertarianism is the doctrine that some human actions are free." Given the definitions above, this is both manifestly fault and constitutes a gross editorial oversight.  Whether or not a libertarian accepts the definition of determinism  Chappell offers will depend on how "causes other than itself" is cashed out.  But more importantly, determinism cannot be logically consistent with libertarianism.  There are no libertarian compatibilists in the same way there are no round squares.  For an introduction to libertarian theories of free agency, see the Stanford Encylopedia under the heading "Incompatibilist (Nondeterministic) Theories of Free Will" here.

So how many philosophers think Descartes believed in liberterian free agency?  Not many.  After all, Descartes believed that God was the first cause of all things.  Furthemore, it seems as if he believed that God is omnisicient in such a way that he has knowledge of all future events.  I think (though there are some interesting issues here) that the conjunction of these two claims defenestrates libertarian free agency.  But the clear clincher is that Descartes seems to have believed that God was the first and total cause of everything that comes to pass, including human free actions. Thus Descartes was a compatibilist.  Strangely enough, I think that those who argue for Cartesian Compatibilism do not base their considerations either wholly or even sometimes primarily on these issues.  In other words, Descartes may have ultimately been a compatibilist, but if we set aside the issue of God being the the first and total cause of everything, I believe we get a much different story.  It is here that I leave the company of most commentators, who seem to think that Descartes was consistently a compatibilist.  But this is not the case. The case for Cartesian Compatibilism can only be succesfully motivated by appealing to divine foreordination or causation, while the rest of Descartes' writings place him squarely in the libertarian camp, or so I contend. 

If it turns out that Descartes was "everywhere else" a libertarian, I think we should call into question some of the theistic commitments so often attributed to him, particularly in light of his openly admitted hesitancy to opine on such matters.  Finally, if this strategy cannot be made to work,  we should consider Descartes a libertarian who appealed to a trinitarian-like "mystery" or "paradox" in order to salvage human freedom.

Excerpt From The Fourth Meditation

From the Cottingham, Stoothoff, and Murdoch (CSM) translation:

Next, when I look more closely at myself and inquire into the nature of my errors (for those are the only evidence of some imperfection in me), I notice that they depend on two concurrent causes, namely on the faculty of choice or freedom of the will; that is, they depend on both the intellect and the will simultaneously.  Now all that the intellect does is to enable me to perceive the ideas which are subjects for possible judgments; and when regarded strictly in this light, it turns  out to contain no error in the proper sense of that term.  For although countless things may exist without there being any corresponding ideas in me, it should not, strictly speaking, be said that I am deprived of these ideas, but merely that I lack them, in a negative sense.  This is because I cannot produce any reason to prove that God ought to have given me a greater faculty of knowledge than he did; and no matter how skilled I understand a craftsman to be, this does not make me think he ought to have put into every one of his works all the perfections which he is able to put into some of them.  Besides, I cannot complain that the will or freedom of choice which I received from God is not sufficiently extensive or perfect, since I know by experience that it is not restricted in any way. 

Indeed, I think it is very noteworthy that there is nothing else in me which is so perfect and so great that the possibility of a further increase in its perfection or greatness is beyond my understanding.  If, for example, I consider the faculty of understanding, I immediately recognize that in my case it is extremely slight and very much finite, and I at once form the idea of an understanding which is much greater – indeed supremely great and infinite; and from the very fact that I can form an idea of it, I perceive that it belongs to the nature of God.  Similarly, if I examine the faculties of memory or imagination, or any others, I discover that in my case each of these faculties is weak and limited, while in the case of God it is immeasurable.  It is only the will, or freedom of choice, which I experience within me to be so great that the idea of any greater faculty is beyond my grasp; so much so that it is above all in virtue of the will that I understand myself to bear in some way the image and likeness of God.  For although God’s will is incomparably greater than mine, both in virtue of the knowledge and power that accompany it and make it more firm and efficacious, and also in virtue of its object, in that it ranges over a greater number of items, nevertheless it does not seem any greater than mine when considered as will in the essential and strict sense.

This is because the will simply consists in our ability to do or not do something (that is, to affirm or deny, to pursue or avoid); or rather (vel potius), it consists simply in the fact that when the intellect puts something forward for affirmation or denital or for pursuit or avoidance, our inclinations are such that we do not feel we are determined by any external force.  In order to be free, there is no need for me to be inclined both ways; on the contrary, the more I incline in one direction – either because I understand that the reasons of truth and goodness point one way, or because of a divinely produced disposition of my inmost thoughts – the freer is my choice.  Neither divine grace nor natural knowledge ever diminishes freedom; on the contrary, they increase and strengthen it.  But the indifference I feel when there is no reason pushing me in one direction rather than another is the lowest grade of freedom; it is evidence not of any perfection of freedom, but rather of a defect in knowledge or a kind of negation.  For if I always saw clearly what was true and good, I should never have to deliberate about the right judgment or choice; in that case, although I should be wholly free, it would be impossible for me ever to be in a state of indifference.

From these considerations I perceive that the power of willing which I received from God is not, when considered in itself, the cause of my mistakes; for it is both extremely ample and also perfect of its kind.  Nor is my power of understanding to blame; for since my understanding comes from God, everything that I understand I undoubtedly understand correctly, and any error here is impossible.  So what then is the source of my mistakes?  It must be simply this: the scope of the will is wider than that of the intellect; but instead of restricting it within the same limits, I extend its use to matters which I do not understand.  Since the will is indifferent in such cases, it easily turns aside form what is true and good, and this is the source of my error and sin.  - CSM, Vol. II, pp. 39-41.

 

Friday, 19 August 2005

Philosophy for Truth's Sake?

According to legend, Thales demonstrated that the visionary philosopher didn't turn to the pursuit of truth for its own sake simply because he was incapable of functioning like any other otherwise successful member of society.  He allegedly demonstrated this by investing in olive (or wine) presses before a boom season on the basis of his mathematical predictions regarding the weather and harvest quality for that year.  I like to think that Thales then donated that money to charity and returned to an impoverished life devoted solely to astronomical, philosophical, and mathematical pursuits.

Now instead of demonstrating the same thing myself, I'm going to tell you how you can get rich quickly by following Thales lead.  According to a vast number of irrefutable recent studies, statistical prediction rules (SPRs) consistently outperform so-called experts in tasks as esoteric as determining the future quality of red Bordeaux wine long before it has finished aging.  In other words, it's about time for Robert Parker to step aside.  We have conclusive scientific proof that an algorithm renders Parker's refined palate obsolete.  (See Trout and Bishop's .pdf article here.)

As it turns out, most folks, particularly the experts who are losing out, find this difficult to believe.  So here's how you strike it rich.  You develop an SPR and bet against mere mortals.  Ideally, you go about this by seeking out some venture capital and founding a company with a futuristic yet classy name.  Then you employ several mathematicians, computer scientists, statisticians and bookies.  The bookies know who's betting the most money and on what.  (Or you could just start with football.)  The mathematicians, computer scientists, and statisticians produce your SPR.  Now you're done.  Bet away and watch the money roll in.   Once you've made enough money, you start replacing so-called experts with SPRs.  Just think how many companies would pay you for an algorithm that was proven to reduce error rates, cut labor costs, save valuable time, diminish the number of lawsuits filed against them, etc...

I'm probably not the first person to suggest this investment, but neither was Thales the first person to invest in olive presses.  If all this is too much work for you, just buy stock in some such company.  I'm going to.  Oh, and if you strike it rich thanks to this blog, how about sending me a kickback?  I accept U.S., Canadian, and Australian Dollars; Euros; Pounds Sterling; and Yen  via the PayPal link in the upper left corner.  I will also accept an awesome blog design. =)

More Police Brutality

Jean Charles de Menezes was murdered by that ring of organized crime almost always happily tolerated and even supported by the people.  His mistake was thinking that he, a Brazilian, would be safe from the "people's mafia" while riding the tube.  The tax dollars of the British financed his slaughter, which was defended by London Mayor Ken Livingstone.  Of course, we can't hold all the British accountable, since many of them are subject (just like those of us on this side of the Atlantic) to the forced redistribution of wealth to idiots with guns.  This is just another way of saying that the "people's mafia" will come after you if you don't finance them.  But I think we can hold those tax payers accountable who are unconcerned, indifferent, apathetic, or (god forbid!) pleased with this state of affairs.

Eight bullets were pumped into this poor, unarmed innocent man even though he was seated and outnumbered by an SO19 armed forces unit and numerous plainclothes police officers who had had dozens opportunities to detain him long before he ever boarded his train.  Frankly, I think the wannabe gangleaders involved who signed up for jobs so that they could legally murder people should be lined up before a citizen firing squad and summarily executed.  Why does society tolerate the employment of trigger happy psychopaths - with IQs (about average) that render them unfit for anything save watching reality TV - by organizations that outfit them with guns and a license to kill innocents? 

See the Menezes Wiki, the leaked ITV report, and an article on Conneticut police insistence on hiring only mental midgets.  For other cases of police brutality, go here to read about cops tazing a six year old boy, a twelve year old girl, a pregnant women, a man suspected of stealing salad in a town near myself, and on and on and on...  Can you really tell yourself that these aren't just a few isolated incidents in an otherwise excellent system?

Some Funny Things

Here are some funny things I  heard this week:

(1)  "My daughter isn't religious!  She reads the Bible!"

Ok.  So I understand this statement.  Being "religious" is equated - for the fundamentalists - with being pharisaical.  The class of so-called "religious folk" is co-extensive, according to those who use this locution, with the class of common, hypocritical, sometimes church-going sinners who hit chapel only on Easter and Christmas.  These poor folks, doomed to hell, profess faith in a deity but don't actually live in accordance with their beliefs.  They're whitewashed tombs: appearing clean and shiny on the outside, they're really decaying refuse on the inside.  In short, the "religious" exhibit misleading outer evidence of a righteous and holy life, while inwardly they're rotting and stinking things up.   Still, it's funny.  Say it again with me: "My daughter isn't religious!  She reads the Bible!"  Good for her.

(2)  "Matter is inherently spatial.  If there were no matter, space wouldn't exist."

I'm was a bit confused here.  First, it wasn't clear to me what was meant by the inherent spatiality of matter.  I was inclined to think that the inherent spatiality of matter meant that matter necessarily and essentialy had spatial properties.  After all, matter is extended in three dimensions, so it has the spatial property of being extended.   That something is extended entails that there is something through which that thing is extended, namely space.  But the exponent of statement (2) didn't see things this way.  There is only something through which a material thing can be extended, he thought, if there are material things.  We discussed whether or not, if all matter was "vanished", space would still exist.  He seemed to think not.  One does, of course, wonder where the matter was vanished from (surely not from nothingness!).  (Yes, I'm a diehard substantivalist. Go Newton!  Go Newton!)

An interesting exercise:  Put your finger in the air and use the tip of it to mark a single point at a particular time t.  Now do the same thing again with a finger on your other hand.  The distance between your two fingers is somewhere between 0 and 10 feet, but what do you think the distance between those two points in space is?

(3)  "I've got all my rows in a duck."

This was amusing.  It was also uttered by the same person who uttered (1).  Brings new meaning to mixed metaphors, doesn't it?

(4)  Quoting Kant, "Time doesn't really exist.  If there were no perceivers, there would be no  such thing as time.  Time is just the form of inner intuition."

The same person who was guilty of asserting (2) attempted to pursue a similar tactic with respect to the unreality of time.  (Come on... McTaggart and Zeno were on to something.)  Still, it seems to me that if anything exists, it exists at some time.  If it manages to exist for some duration, that is, for awhile, then there are several times at which it exists.  Of course, some things exist.  Furthermore, some things have existed which no longer exist (dinosaurs, for example).  Therefore, there are times at which things have existed, and at the present time, some things no longer exist.  Since there are times, time exists.  Some things would have existed even if no perceivers existed.  Therefore, time would have existed even if no perceivers ever existed.  So time is not "just" the "form of inner intuition". 

Now I find (1), (2), (3) and (4) equally humorous.  I hope this doesn't tell poorly about my philosophical abilities.  I understand that some philosophers defend (2) and (4), but then, some philosophers are also 4-D'ers and Lewisian Modal Realists.  =)  If you want more basic, intuitive arguments for the views espoused in the responses to (2) and (4), feel free to ask.

For the record, here are some of the tenets of commonsensism:

(A)  Everything is wholly present at every time it exists.
(B)  The past existed, but does no longer.
(C)  The present exists, but only for a moment.
(D)  The future will exist, but does not yet.
(E)  If anything exists, there is some location at which it exists.
(F)  Space is three-dimensional.
(G)  The shortest distance between two points in space is a straight line.
(H)  And that is enough for tonight...

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