At Left2Right, David Velleman provides a pointer to some very sensible remarks by Tuft's philosopher Daniel Dennett. I admit to being pleasantly surprised upon finding Dennett defending the transcendental foundations of morality by analogy with the transcendental foundations of mathematics, a reaction which I suppose betrays a lack of familiarity with most of Dennett's work and an overly critical attitude towards a philosopher who denies, at least in some confused sense, the existence of consciousness. This is incredibly geeky, but hearing Dennett compare eternal arithemtical and moral truths with the Platonic forms made my day!
Unfortunately, a vast minority of unthinking religious fanatics subscribe to the view that without God there could be no morality. This is a well-entrenched belief in numerous fundamentalist circles, even though it has, as far as I can tell, absolutely no rational basis whatsoever. I'm now going to amuse myself with a historically overused counterpossible sentence construction and suggest that even supposing that God exists, and does in fact somehow (per impossible) provide the foundations for morality, this need not have been the case. In other words, pace the strange theists I have in mind, things could have been otherwise. (Amuse yourself by considering the modal implications of the suggestion that a necessary being might not have existed. Now reject S5.) Dworkin, in Objectivity and Truth: You'd Better Believe It, makes explicit the moral position being criticized:
I gave another example: many people believe that the discovery that God
is dead (or otherwise engaged) would be catastrophic for morality. Though,
once again, atheism is not itself a positive moral judgment, this argument
also requires a premise that is-the premise that God is the one source of
moral value, that His will, and that alone, can generate obligation and
virtue.
In that article, Dworkin identifies the overly "familiar claim that since there is no God morality is bunk". Theists run a modus tollens, stating that if there were no God, morality would be bunk, but since there are moral truths, God must exist. Dennett effectively equates this modus tollens with the equally absurd argument for God's existence from necessary mathematical propositions. Because it's funny, I'll extensively quote Bahnsen quoting and expanding upon Van Til in Van Til's Apologetic: Readings and Analysis:
Van Til did not address specific disuptes between philosophers or contemporary debates regarding possibility, but he realized that Christians are committed to hold certain beliefs about possibility that unbelievers will reject. "It is today more evident than ever before that it is exactly on those most fundamental matters, such as possibility and probability, that there is the greatest difference of opinon between theist and anti-theists." To put it simply and memorably: "Non-believers have false assumptions about their musts." Van Til was particularly keen to observe that "abstract possibility" must not be "placed higher than God" - a metaphor for asserting that God is not enveloped (and does not have His source) in a broader kind of "possibility"; rather, there are no "possibilities" that are independent of Him, His knowledge, or His plan. "The meaning of the word possibility is first determined by the God who has spoken to sinners through the book [the Bible]. That, and only that, is possible which the God of the Bible determines." So the antithesis with unbelieving thought is felt at this most basic philosophical level. "For the Christian, God legislates as to what is possible and what is impossible for man. For the non-Christian, man determines this for himself. Either positively or negatively the non-Christian will determine the field of possibility and therewith the stream of history by means of the law of contradiction. This means that for the non-Christian the concepts that he employs while using the law of contradiction are taken to be exhaustive of the 'essence of the thing' they seek to express. Van Til detected subtle intellectual arrogance even in the way unbelievers treat possibility. "The law of non-contradiction employed positively or negatively by man assuming his own ultimacy, is made the standard of what is possible or impossible, both for men and for whatever 'gods' may be. But on this basis the Bible cannot speak to man or any God whose revelation and whose very nature is not essentially penetrable to the natural intellect of man." Neither man's mind nor "reason" has the prerogative of deciding whether a thing is possible or impossible.
In this confused passage we get an explicit affirmation of the thesis Dennett criticizes with the mere substitution of modality for mathematics or morality. Van Til, in fact, goes on to explicitly claim that God is (and must be!) the source of all possibility. The same lack of clarity evidenced in the similar claims of other theist resurfaces here, as for example where Bahnsen uses a metaphor ("enveloped") to explain a metaphor ("possibility... placed higher than God"). It is unfortunate that bizaree and false claims such as these are so effectively propogated amongst the uneducated religious by this sort of psychobabble.
Dennett is especially clear on one point: we discovered - as opposed to invented - mathematics. The alleged arrogance of the enlightened man is that he believes in the openeness of reality to discovery. It is a fundamental pressuposition of rationalism and realism that there is a way the world is, and that, moreover, we human persons are in a privileged position that permits us to investigate the way the world is and discover true propositions that describe it. One of our faculties that makes possible this discovery of the way the world is we call "reason", and using reason (and rational intuition), we can arrive at decisions about what is and is not possible. Thus I can confidently assert that it is not possible for Berkeley College to be topped with round square cupolas, God be damned. That's because, like truths of arithematic and morality, truths about modality are features of the world that can be discovered by men using reason. Are you arrogant or not? I sure as hell am.
Let's end with a quote from Dennett in response to Robert Wright's question:
RW: I guess the question is: You don't see belief in God, or even belief in any kind of higher power or even a belief in a transcendent foundation for morality... You don't see any of that as really necessary as far as creating good behavior goes?
DD: Let's talk about "transcendence" and "morality". One of the things that we have evolved to discover on this planet is arithmetic. We didn't invent it. We didn't make it. We found it. It is eternal, a priori, true. It's just great stuff. And it's true everywhere in the universe. It's true everywhere in any universe. There's only one arithemetic. Now is that transcendence? I would say, Yeah... I don't know, for sure, what you mean by transcendence... It's a sort of Platonism... We've discovered it, and it's true. Now could there be a sort of similarly Platonic ethics? Could we find the universal principles of good behavior for intelligent beings? I'm agnostic about that. I don't see why we couldn't. I don't see that the parochialism of our concerns would necessarily stand in the way. We could ask the same questions about ethics that we ask about arithmetic.
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