Scott Hagaman

"Nous" has numerous philosophical uses. For example, there's a philosophy journal called "Nous". And it is a little known fact that "nous" has a non-philosophical use as well. The Oxford English Dictionary offers these definitions:

1. Greek Philos. Mind, intellect; intelligence; intuitive apprehension.
2. colloq. (chiefly Brit.). Common sense, practical intelligence, ‘gumption’.

This blog's title derives mostly from the second use, so the title is really a very pretentious manner of saying: "Scottish Commonsense". (I do, of course, favor the more pretentious expression for its link to the notions of rational intuition, reason, logos, the good, and the privileged faculties of the soul.)

Now "Scottish Commonsense" is, shamelessly, a plural referring term. Yes, yes, my name is Scott, so that much is clear, but the title also refers to a particular philosophical tradition that is currently experiencing something of a revival. Sir Thomas Reid was the prolific figurehead of this movement and wrote much in response to David Hume. While commonsense does not always get things right, I think philosophers need to apply its principles more frequently to curb some of their occasionally wild and ridiculous speculations. For example, while a brilliant philosopher, what David Lewis needed was a good dose of Scottish commonsense. This blog is thus devoted to commonsensical analytic philosophy. We don't believe in beth three spatio-temporally disconnected concrete particulars here.

Ok, so now a little about me and my interests. I'm a graduate student in philosophy currently working on completing my Ph.D. at the University of Notre Dame. I have numerous degrees at this point, including a B.S. in Chemistry and a B.A. in Philosophy, both from the University of Tennessee at Knoxville. Chemistry was my primary major, which may help serve to explain my scientific predilections and interest in modern analytic philosophy. I also have an M.A. in Philosophy from the University of Colorado at Boulder, where I worked primarily under Bealer, Tooley and Huemer.

My areas of interest, hierarchically ordered, include epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of science, logic, existentialism, and philosophy of religion. It is a scientifically proven fact that too much logic and metaphysics (or even rigorous analytic philosophy, more generally) turns one into an immensely ennui-inducing character. So if you find yourself to be perceived as the bore of a party, I recommend regular doses of Kierkegaard as a means to increase your charm.

Within epistemology I am most interested in the differences between internalist and externalist accounts of justification with respect to their capacity for and success at accomodating access requirements to higher-order epistemic beliefs. Some objections to certain sorts of externalism, for example, such as those recently espoused by Fumerton and Cohen, hold that justification for believing that one's cognitive faculties are reliable belief forming mechanisms is far too easily come by - indeed, even epistemically circular. Other current topics of interest currently occupying my time include the difference between mentalist and internalist accounts of justification; the plausibility of mentalism; foundationalism and self-justifying propositions (roughly, propositions which say of themselves that they are justified); the metaphysics of space and time; contexualist accounts of knowledge and epistemic possibility; the plausibility of some (heavily) modified versions of the KK-thesis (Chisolm's objectivity principle, for one); the epistemological and metaphysical foundations and commitments of science, math, and religion; and a bit of dabbling in determinism, compatibilism, and free will.

I wrote my M.A. on epistemic circularity, where I evaluated alleged entailments between foundationalism (or rationalism more broadly) and epistemically circular arguments, examining the respective plausibilities of both the entailments and the consequences of the circularity. Is it not true, as Alston and Bermann suggest, that epistemic circularity is not always malignant.

In my spare time, I enjoy, skiing, shooting pool, having a drink at the local dive bar with friends, computer games (recently, Minions of Mirth).